Background
The 1962 war with China was a watershed moment in Indian history and acted as a 10,000 V shock to the Indian dealership and proved to the people of India that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a good talker and philosopher, but had no knowledge or comprehension of what is military power and strategic dominance. He was of the view that India could be friends with China and frankly, he was living in a fool’s paradise, thinking that India and China would be partners together. He failed to realize that there can only be one sword in the scabbard, and the Chinese are not going to allow India to be that sword.
He failed to act when China invaded Tibet in 1949 end and on top of it helped the Chinese army by allowing food grains to be sent across India from the port of Calcutta to feed the Chinese army In Tibet. Nothing could be more foolish than this, and despite Sardar Patel advising him that the Chinese should not be helped but opposed, he went with his whims and notions., He had a firm belief that China was a friend.
He visited China and played host to the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou en Lai in Delhi in 1954. His foolishness was apparent when all the hard work done by the British and getting special privileges in Tibet, which had been created as a buffer state were given up by him without any quid pro quo. India just lost all hold in Tibet. Right from 1950 China began to show Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh as part of China but Nehru did not even protest.
Reluctantly when came to know that the Chinese had occupied almost 30,000 mi.² of Indian territory and the so-called Johnson Lane breached Nehru was hiding these facts from the Indian people and continued his friendly overtures to China. It is difficult to understand what were his compulsions.
Before attacking India, the Chinese leader, Mao Tse Tung got the approval of Nikita Khrushchev, Prime Minister of Russia. He gave us approval because he was involved in the missile crisis with America in Cuba, and he needed Chinese support. After that Mao addressed the central committee of the communist party on the second, October 1962, and informed them that Nehru must be taught a lesson.
Nehru at that time had formulated a forward policy much against the advice of the military, to set up military posts in no man’s land, to which the Chinese objected, but Nehru ignored these because he had no political knowledge of military power just give the order to Krishna, Madan, who himself is an incompetent individual the army jeep gel topper at that time with Yasmin and he let the country down by taking orders from a joint secretary of the central government. He left in disgrace later.
Nehru considered himself a great Third World leader, was also the leader of the non-aligned block, and gave regular sermons to American and Western leadership; he was now humbled after the Chinese attack and realized he had erred in his approach. The Chinese cut Nehru to size and made him the object of ridicule
In pursuance of the Direction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army(PLA) decided to attack two places Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency. In this article, I’m going to discuss the Chinese attack in the east at Namka Chu. The Indian army fought bravely but without resources and ammo, they were easy fodder for the Chinese. Nehru is responsible for this massacre and sadly many in India still feel he has a great legacy.
The battle at Namka Chu
The Chinese had studied the terrain very well. In addition, they had been fighting on the Tibetan plateau for the last three years against the Khampa insurgents, which were being aided by the United States and India. Their troops were also acclimatized and well equipped with winter clothing and automatic rifles, while the Indian army was still using bolt action Lee Enfield rifles, of First World War vintage. After receiving instructions, the Chinese between 19 and 20 October 1962, began to concentrate and deploy, a prelude to attack. They occupied three specific positions across the Thagla Ridge region.
First, they set up defensive positions on the riverbank of the Namka Chu. This is a fast-flowing river near the Tagliare which flows near the Thagla Ridge. In step 2 they occupied the slopes and crest of the ridge. This information is annotated in the notes of the official history of the 1962 war, published by India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 1992–93.
By 20 October, the Chinese army strength in the Thagla Ridge area had grown from four battalions to a full division. Indians just kept looking waiting for instructions; in any case, they were very few.
At exactly 5 a.m., the attack began. Heavy mortar fire rained on the Indian posts spread across the Namka Chu region. This motor fire continued for an hour, after which the Chinese brought in field guns and began to shell the Indian positions at Dhola post and Tsangdhar Ridge, on the banks of the Namka Chu.
The shelling and mortar fire continued for two hours before the Chinese infantry launched an attack at 7 AM. The Dhola post was occupied. Many of the defendants were killed when a last charge was made by Major Gurdial Singh of 2 Rajput. In the face of superior tire, including artillery, the charge field, and very few of the Indian troops survived major. Goodall Singh was taken as a prisoner of war. He received the Mahavir Chakra for his bravery, while he was still in the custody of the Chinese.
It is sad to record that, 282 soldiers from the Rajput Regiment died defending Dhola. Very few were taken POW as the men fought to the last bullet. it must be noted that the defendants had very little ammunition, no heavy artillery, and no supplies from the base because the army brass never expected the Chinese to attack as per the assurance given by the intelligence chief Malik.
After sanitizing this post the Chinese pressed forward and by eight and 8:30 PM they surprised the Indians at Tsangdhar. They attacked the Indian positions via the flanks and overran the post.
While this action was going on, the Chinese were preparing to cross the Nam Chu River. The artillery guns opened up to give cover cover fire to their troops, assaulting the Indians across the Namka Chu, from positions taken at forward slopes of the Thagla Ridge, explains the official war history.
As the carnage unfolded on 20 October, pockets of resistance from the Indians endured at Tsangdhar, the MoD’s war history claims.
“The Rajputs and Gorkhas deployed at these locations [Dhola & Tsangdhar] gave a tough fight,” it says, but adds that they were “soon overpowered.”
Significantly, when the Chinese onslaught began across the Namka Chu, India’s lines of communication with the brigade headquarters had been destroyed. The Chinese had successfully infiltrated the Indian communication system.
Captain Ravi of 2 Rajput had to physically go and inform the brigade headquarters that his company had been wiped out at Dhola. The situation was pathetic as at all battle points, many mortar and gun positions of the Indian units could not be contacted. The Chinese had blocked the radio frequencies of the Indian forces with the help of jammers.
By the afternoon of 20 October, the Chinese had either destroyed Indian posts across the Namka Chu or driven them back. Finally, troops at Tsangdhar were also ordered to withdraw southwards to Lumpo on 20 October.
Half a day into battle, the Indians had lost so many men, especially in Dhola and Tsangdhar, that they had to withdraw across the Namka Chu region.
Essentially, three battalions of Indian troops were given the responsibility to defend over 20 km of territory. This was an impossible task, given the long marching distances over unfamiliar terrain. The troops were hampered by limited firepower, a paucity of manpower, poor logistics and supply lines. All these significantly enhanced the challenges faced by Indian troops.
Finally, Nehru in an overreaction had ordered the defense minister to throw the Chinese out. Thus the objective at Thagla was not to defend but to attack. and throw the Chinese out. This was an impossible goal in the given circumstances.
The war history says. that because of manifold handicaps, the withdrawal of the Indian troops from the Dhola sector was unavoidable.
Last word
The battle of Namka Chu is important because it set the tone for the subsequent battle. The Chinese had attacked on the 20th of October 1962 and a petrified Nehro sent two letters to President, John Kennedy, requesting for Military aid. Kennedy responded and immediately promised $500 million in military aid, and American Air Force planes began to ferry arms to India.
Winter was also going to set in and the Chinese were aware with snow covering the Himalayas all the troops south of the Himalayas would be cut off and become easy fodder for the Indian and American forces. This was because the Himalayas would become a natural barrier.
Having achieved their objective of humiliating Nehru the Chinese on the 23rd of November 1962 declared a unilateral cease-fire and wonder of wonders vacated all the areas they had occupied.
Had the war continued the Indian forces, which were now getting into the act with the help of the Americans. Also, the use of the Air Force would have pulverized the Chinese, so the Chinese thought it better to retreat when they had all the aces and show the world that they were a peace-loving country.
- by MG Singh emge21
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